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This thesis analyses the ratchet effect in the context of the performance 
scheme implemented by Brazilian tax collection in 1988 to reward tax officials for their 
effort in collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations, using panel data for 110 tax 
agencies from August 1989 to April 1993 and employing the GMM-system estimator. 
The estimates suggest the presence of ratchet effect, i.e., the more the tax officials do 
today, the more the tax officials are asked to do in the future. This result endangers the 
credibility of the Brazilian tax authority’s incentive program as an incentive system. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
In hierarchical environments agents interact with each other time after time. All 
agents (subordinates) contracted with the same principal (superior) operate under 
formally identical contract provisions. In these contracts agents frequently have more 
information about their productivities (or the productivity of their division) than their 
principals yielding moral hazard problems. In these situations, the principal often relies 
on observations of performance to judge the productivity of the agents and to forecast 
future performance. After the principal learns the agents’ productivity levels, he is 
motivated to treat agents differently, using, for example, the information learned to 
assign more difficult tasks to higher-ability agents.  
The superior chooses an incentive scheme, which specifies a reward to agents. 
Weitzman (1980) establishes two basic incentive problems associated with a standard 
reward system: static and dynamic. The subordinate reacts to this incentive scheme by 
choosing the level of effort. In a static problem we have the dilemma where the worker 
or the manager will try to convince his superiors misrepresenting in hopes of 
influencing the plan while it is being formulated. The dynamic incentive problem arises 
when planners use current performance as a criterion to determine future targets. The 
regulator observes the productivity in the first period then rewards the individuals and 
updates their belief about the worker’s efficiency. In the next period the superior 
chooses the optimal target given his posterior belief, and subsequently the agents 
chooses their effort and are rewarded. This behavior reduces the subordinates’ 
incentive to produce efficiently today in order to manipulate the regulator’s belief. This 
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phenomenon has been called the “ratchet effect1” (see Weitzman, 1976). The ratchet 
effect occurs when the agent underperforms, that is, the agent will reduce his 
productivity in early periods to avoid being held to a higher standard in the future. This 
is a type of negative implicit incentive problem that, in general, occurs in long-term 
employment relationships. 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the ratchet effect in the context of 
the performance scheme implemented by Brazilian tax collection in 1988 called 
“Retribuição Adicional Variável” (RAV) to reward tax officials for their efforts in 
collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations. The program created a bonus fund 
called “Fundo Especial de Desenvolvimento e Aperfeiçoamento das Atividades de 
Fiscalização (FUNDAF) for distribution among tax officials, that has amounted to about 
68% of total fines collected2. This bonus is composed by an individual reward and a 
group reward. Both types of reward increase with the total of fines collected, 
subsequently both have incentives to increase their productivity. Groups’ rewards are 
paid with 30% of available monthly revenues, while individual rewards are paid with 
remaining 70%. The group reward is calculated according to the efficiency of the 
agency relative to other agencies in the country. All members are equally 
compensated within a given tax agency. The individual reward compensates the 
official for his/her individual effort and is based on individual monthly evaluation of 
performance executed by supervisors of tax agencies. 
The managers of tax agencies were induced to allocate resources efficiently 
within the tax agencies. Every month, the agencies’ goals were adjusted in agreement 
with the past performance and, therefore, the future goals were determined. The 110 
                                            
1 The term “ratchet effect” was first introduced by Berliner (1952) in his study of the Soviet 
history to refer the situation when managers on a performance related contract were given 
higher targets if they had significantly outperformed the target in the previous period. Weitzman 
(1980) further introduced this concept in the principal-agent framework. 
2 See Kahn, Silva & Ziliak (2001) for more details.  
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tax agencies were ranked according to their performance each month. This tendency 
has sometimes been called the ratchet effect, because current performance 
establishes the point of departure for next period’s target. In such situations, the 
agents face a dynamic tradeoff between present rewards for better current 
performance and future losses from the assignment of higher targets. 
The investigations presented in this research indicate that the bonus program is 
sensitive to a tax agency past economic performance suggesting there be a ratchet 
effect. In addition, the Labour productivity variables – TTN and AFTN – used in this 
research are important components to determine the tax agency’s performance. 
The composition of this thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 
outlines a discussion of previous relevant theories and literature on ratchet effect. 
Chapter 3 presents the dataset and the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
method of our dynamic panel data model. Chapter 4 discusses the results obtained on 
a panel data set relative to the performance scheme implemented by Brazilian tax 
collection in 110 tax agencies over the period from August 1989 to April 1993 using 
GMM system estimator. Finally, as a conclusion, the analysis result for the main 
subject is summarized.  
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CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1. Ratchet Effect 
Ratcheting is the phenomenon whereby better performance today by the 
agents causes the principal to upgrade her expectations concerning the agent’s ability 
and consequently to provide lower remuneration for a given level of performance 
tomorrow, thereby discouraging better performance today.  
The ratchet effect has been carefully studied by several authors. Freixas, 
Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) analyzed the ratchet effect in the context of a game and 
showed that the ratchet effect exists, in the sense that the planner may select a 
scheme which is suboptimal from a static viewpoint in order to stimulate revelation. 
Laffont and Tirole (1988) formalize and confirm the general intuition about the ratchet 
effect. They found that the ratchet effect for any first-period incentive scheme, there 
exist no separating equilibrium and when uncertainty about the agent’s ability is small, 
the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling. Kanemoto and MacLeod 
(1992) showed that competition for older workers can moderate the ratchet effect. 
They conclude that the existence of a market for older workers ensures that the default 
payoffs of the worker depend on the worker’s ability, and the firm cannot use any 
information gained by observing first-period performance to adjust second-period piece 
rates.  
Meyer (1995) demonstrates that dynamic incentive such as the ratchet effect is 
important. Meyer & Vickers (1997) investigate how comparative performance 
information influences the ratchet effect. They showed that, under certain 
circumstances, comparative performance information reduces the ratchet effect, and 
through this direction improves welfare. Indjejikian & Nanda (1999) described how the 
ratchet effect affects dynamic principal-agent relationships. They compared a 
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consolidated structure with a specialized one and showed that the presence of ratchet 
effect tends to favor a consolidated structure. Consolidated structures can be created 
by assigning multiple responsibilities to a single employee and this way is able to avoid 
agency conflicts.  
Dillen and Lundholm (1996) relate the ratchet effect to a contribution 
mechanism for a public good. Contrasting many public goods that are financed through 
long term contribution schemes (e.g. tax-systems), there are situations in which no 
such a commitment is made and contribution is set again by the central planner (tax 
authority) in each period. Hence, it might be that the observed (past) performance acts 
as a target in fixing the point of departure for next period’s contribution level. This 
resembles a sort of ratchet effect, where future outcome is determined by the current 
contribution level. Chaudhuri (1998) investigated the ratchet effect in a dynamic 
principal-agent where the principal does not have complete information. The principal 
uses any information revealed by the agent’s actions to extract the latter’s information 
rent in future periods – the “ratchet principle”. Chaudhuri (1998) actually find little 
evidence of ratcheting. 
Vuslat Us (2003) investigates the persistence of currency substitution in Turkey 
through inclusion of a ratchet variable – the past peak value of the currency 
substitution – in two sub periods: 1990-93 and 1995-99. Results using an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach show that the inclusion of the ratchet 
variable into the model produces insignificants coefficients in the first period, but 
significant coefficients in the second. The ratchet effect is not evident in the overall 
economy. The conclusion about currency substitution not being subject to a ratchet 
effect should not be misleading. 
Ventura, González and Cárcaba (2004) presented an empirical study to 
examine the evolution of productivity in the Spanish health system during the period of 
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program-contracts applying the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
The result of the empirical analysis shows that the program-contract has been subject 
to a ratchet effect, i.e., the more the hospital does today, the more the hospital is 
asked to do in future.  
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CHAPTER 3 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1. Data Description  
This section will provide detailed information about the data set and the next 
section will present the empirical model and the results of the empirical analysis of this 
research. The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of monthly observations from 
August 1989 to April 1993. The dataset includes 110 tax agencies - one central 
agency, ten supervisory regional agencies and 99 local agencies. See table 1 below 
for a list of local agencies included in this study. 
 
 
Table 1: Regions and Agencies included in our sample 
  
Groups Agencies 
North Boa Vista, Belém, Macapá, Manaus, Monte Dourado, Porto Belém, Porto Manaus, Porto Velho, Rio Branco, Santarém 
Northeast 
ALF/Fortaleza, Aracaju, Araçatuba, Caruaru, Feira de Santana, Fortaleza, Ilhéus, 
João Pessoa, Juazeiro, Maceió, Natal, Porto Recife, Porto Salvador, Recife, 
Salvador, São Luiz, Teresina, Vitoria da Conquista 
South 
Cascavel, Caxias do Sul, Curitiba, Florianópolis, Foz do Iguaçu, Salgado Filho 
Airport, Imperatriz, IRF/Chuí, IRF/Porto Alegre, Joaçaba, Joinville, Londrina, 
Maringá, Novo Hamburgo, Santana do Livramento, Paranaguá, Passo Fundo, 
Pelotas, Ponta Grossa, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande, Santa Maria, Santo Ângelo, São 
Sebastião, Uruguaiana 
Southeast 
Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro Airport, Bauru, Belo Horizonte, Campinas, Campos, 
Contagem, Curvelo, Divinópolis, Governador Valadares, Guarulhos, Guarulhos 
Airport, Juiz de Fora, Limeira, Monte Claros, Niterói, Nova Iguaçu, Osasco, Porto 
Rio de Janeiro, Presidente Prudente, Tancredo Neves Airport, Rio de Janeiro, Rio 
Preto, Santo André, Santos, São Jose do Rio Preto, São Paulo, Sorocaba, Taubaté, 
Viracopos Airport, Uberaba, Uberlândia, Varginha, Vitória, Volta Redonda 
Midwest Brasília Airport, Brasília, Campo Grande, Corumbá, Cuiabá, Goiânia, Itajaí, Mundo Novo, Ponta Porã, Remessas Internacionais 
 
 
The data used in our empirical test comes from two sources. Information about 
performance, ranking, AFTN, TTN and fines collected are from the Brazilian tax 
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collection authority (Departamento Secretaria da Receita Federal – Coordenação de 
Fiscalização).  Information about the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and energy come 
from IPEA, a Brazilian government research institute. GDP and fines collected were 
seasonally adjusted using Consumer Price Index (IPC) into 2000 prices, and then 
converted to 2000 dollars using the relevant exchange rate, provided by The Brazilian 
Central Bank.  
The bonus or reward (RAV) paid to tax officials increase with the amount of 
fines collected. The bonus can be denoted by target plus either loss or overdue fines 
collected. Therefore, Performance, that represents the dependent variable, can be 
measured as the ratio of either loss or overdue fines collected per deserved resources. 
Ranking is the way to measure the relative performance in reaching pre-established 
goal. Ranking is a proxy of three performances (number of inspections or examinations 
undertaken, collection of overdue taxes and fines and the total amount of taxes 
collected). To quantify the size of agency the number of tax officials was used. There 
are two types of tax officials in the Secetaria da Receita Federal: auditors (AFTNs) and 
administrative bureaucrats (TTNs). Auditors are highly skilled; their duties include 
examinations of tax returns, collection of overdue taxes and fines, and supervision of 
tax agencies. Administrative bureaucrats usually play a more passive role in the 
collection procedure. The Labour productivity can as well be tested using the number 
of auditors (AFTN) and administrative bureaucrats (TTNs). I also constructed quarterly 
dummies for the period from August 1989 to April 1993, because the targets based on 







Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 4159 119.27 22.25 -106.83 355.48 
TTN 4581 49.77 60.43 1 570 
AFTN 4581 53.08 85.86 1 618 
Ranking 4671 53.71 30.6 1 110 
Fines 3201 456093.6 1054789 0 1.11e+07 
GDP 4725 28730.65 47337.08 48.95 349735.3 
North Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 453 115.95 22.32 4.99 195.9 
TTN 473 27.37 17.62 1 86 
AFTN 473 22.61 23.55 1 86 
Ranking 480 55.02 31.70 1 110 
Fines 306 96917.07 118039.7 314.04 655284.4 
GDP 495 2939.47 4083.55 48.95 23663.51 
Northeast Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 713 117.89 22.38 48.32 189.02 
TTN 736 40.24 22.29 7 114 
AFTN 736 35.62 32.76 5 156 
Ranking 788 71.08 26.77 4 109 
Fines 510 157522.9 182961.5 5721.58 1119249 
GDP 810 5783.40 7213.92 186.43 43468.21 
South Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 924 124.72 21.29 32.91 210.25 
TTN 956 40.5 24.77 12 147 
AFTN 956 33.95 24.63 9 125 
Ranking 958 46.01 27.16 1 105 
Fines 718 246226.8 391719.5 8993.09 2538288 
GDP 1080 18099.35 16803.02 2090.07 89679.86 
Southeast Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 1635 116.2 21.9 -106.83 355.48 
TTN 1771 57.74 62.61 3 418 
AFTN 1771 76.74 112.94 5 618 
Ranking 1787 50.77 31.95 1 109 
Fines 1199 737496.7 1563102 0 1.11e+07 
GDP 1935 56149.95 62833.95 847.7 349735.3 
Midwest Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 334 122 22.48 57.14 191.31 
TTN 387 92.96 138.23 1 570 
AFTN 387 77.69 136.25 1 600 
Ranking 394 44.63 25.21 1 108 
Fines 264 242351.7 539744.5 0 5490269 
GDP 405 3494.5 3284.93 419.48 19377.73 
 
 
The tax agencies were classified into regions based on their geographical 
localization: North, Northeast, South, Southeast and Midwest. Table 2 presents key 
descriptive statistics of the data. The mean Performance is 115.95, with the maximum 
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of 355.48 and minimum of -106.83 in Southeast. South presented the highest average 
performance. The average Ranking is 53.71. Midwest and South exhibited the lowest 
average ranking while Northeast and North featured the highest average. Moreover, 
there is considerable difference between the average GDP of the richest region and 
those of the poorest. North and Northeast were the lowest fines collected and South 
and Southeast presented the highest GDP. This phenomenon is strongly related with 
the economic capacity for each region. Fines collected in North is only 21 per cent of 
the national average, while in Southeast it is 162 per cent, more than twice as great. 
There is a large variance in number of AFTN’s within Midwest and Southeast, which 
can be explained by reallocation of the staffs to increase the amount of taxes collected.  
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix (2782 observations) 
 Performance Ranking TTN AFTN Fines Energy GDP North Northeast South Southeast Midwest 
Performance 1.0000            
Ranking -0.1592 1.0000           
TTN -0.0911 -0.0984 1.0000          
AFTN -0.0890 -0.1292 0.8973 1.0000         
Fines -0.0108 -0.2049 0.6376 0.7053 1.0000        
Energy -0.0823 -0.2355 0.0924 0.2483 0.2251 1.0000       
GDP -0.1251 -0.1568 0.1081 0.1618 0.1187 0.6486 1.0000      
North -0.0374 0.0523 -0.1573 -0.1261 -0.0976 -0.2457 -0.1846 1.0000     
Northeast -0.0336 0.2773 -0.0686 -0.0768 -0.0905 -0.3223 -0.2201 -0.1608 1.0000    
South 0.1596 -0.0923 -0.0387 -0.0961 -0.0852 -0.3598 -0.1244 -0.1949 -0.2623 1.0000   
Southeast -0.1196 -0.1212 0.1716 0.2551 0.2190 0.8462 0.4868 -0.2771 -0.3728 -0.4518 1.0000  
Midwest 0.0526 -0.0854 0.0276 -0.0548 -0.0206 -0.2170 -0.1565 -0.1040 -0.1400 -0.1697 -0.2412 1.0000 
 
 
Table 3 provides us with information about correlation coefficients. The first 
column is particularly important because it informs us about the correlation coefficient 
between the dependent variable and each of the explanatory variables. These 
correlation coefficients permit us to see whether our regression results may suffer from 
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multicolinearity problems and also give us some clues about the expected signs of our 
regression coefficient estimates. The Performance is not highly correlated with any of the 
independent variables. The highest correlation coefficient in the first column is -0.1596 
(South). The high correlation in the second column, 0.2773 (Northeast) inform us that 
the tax agency grouping Northeast has the worse ranking. It is worth mentioning that the 
correlation coefficient between Tax and AFTN (0.7053) and Tax and TTN (0.6376) are 
very high. It is not surprising because fines collected should be an increasing function of 
TTN and AFTN. Southeast has a positive and high correlation with energy and GDP 
which tell us that southeast is a rich economic area.  
3.2. Empirical procedure 
This paper will test the existence of a ratchet effect in the bonus program to 
compensate tax officials for their efforts in collecting taxes created by Brazilian 
government, using monthly data from 110 tax agencies in the country – one central 
agency, ten supervisory regional agencies and 99 local agencies – from August 1989 to 
April 1993. 
Some of the advantages of using the panel data approach are: availability of a 
large number of data points help in reducing problem of limited degrees of freedom and 
enhance the efficiency of the estimators; problem of multicolinearity is less likely since 
explanatory variables vary in two dimensions; problem of omitted variables can be 
reduced by explicitly modeling unobserved variables as a unit-specific effect or time-
specific effect or both.  
The ratchet effect means that the better the execution in one period, the larger 
the increase in the targets for the next period. The Performance level provides a 
reasonable target variable for the empirical model. An increment in the Performance 
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level can be reached by increasing the amount of fine collected, the relative efficiency 
in realization pre-established goal - ranking3 - and by decreasing the average number 
of auditors and high-level supervisors assigned (AFTNs) and administrative 
bureaucrats (TTNs). It is reasonable to assume that the monthly variation in the target 
will depend on the last period’s performance and last period’s target.  
The variation in the performance scheme targets may depend on the tax 
agency’s efficiency. A very inefficient tax agency could increase the amount of fine 
collected (and thus the target) more than a very efficient tax agency, without an 
additional increase in input endowment. Thus, raise the ranking should be inversely 
correlated with variations in targets. A small number of AFTN in the tax agency would 
allow an augment in the efficiency, and consequently, in the Performance level. 
Therefore, if a small number of AFTN translates into a greater Performance level for 
the following month, this should also increase the formation of next period’s target. 
The model estimated in this study will take the form of a dynamic panel data 
econometric model to test the existence of a ratchet effect. The econometric 
specification for our empirical model is the following: 
titititititititi XAFTNTTNFinesePerformancePerformanc ,,,4,3,21,1, εδδβαααα +++++++= −          
(1) 
where tiX ,  can be a vector of explanatory variables some of which are predetermined 
or endogenous defined in the previous section. The vector X  can include current and 
lagged dependent variables. The subscript i  and t  denote tax agency and time 
period, respectively; iδ  is a tax agency fixed effect, tδ  is a time effect, and ti,ε is the 
error term. 
                                            
3 Ranking is a Proxy of three performances (number of inspections or examinations 
undertaken, collection of overdue taxes and fines e the total amount of taxes collected) utilized 
to define the tax agencies’ target.  
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There are several estimation problems that may occur in estimating these 
empirical models. In such a formulation least-squares estimates are biased both in the 
case that unobservable tax agency-specific effects ( )iδ  are statistically significant, and 
in the case that regressors and these effects are correlated. Further, there exists a 
significant relationship between Performance level in t  and 1−t ; for this reason; we 
include the lagged dependent variable ( )1, −tiePerformanc  in our empirical model. In 
such a framework, OLS results in inconsistent estimates since 1, −tiePerformanc  and iδ  
are necessarily correlated, even if the idiosyncratic component of the error term is 
serially uncorrelated4. The tax agency-specific effects ( )iδ  can be eliminated by taking 
first-differences. However, OLS still does not consistently estimate the parameters of 
interest because 1, −tiePerformanc  and ti,ε  are correlated trough the terms 
1, −tiePerformanc  and 1, −tiε . A different solution to first differences transformation is the 
within transformation; however, and even though controlling for fixed effects, the within 
transformation leads to consistent estimates only under the hypothesis of strictly 
exogenous regressors. Since the model estimated is a dynamic model, the dependent 
variable may be subject to measurement errors, which induce biases in the estimates.  
The presence of unobserved tax agency-specific effects and the possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable can be confronted by using instruments for the 
potentially endogenous variables and employing Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimators. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) estimator that first-differences the dynamic equation, and uses lagged 
variables as instruments in order to obtain efficient estimates.  
                                            
4 See Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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Endogenous variables in levels lagged two or more periods will be valid 
instruments, provided there is no autocorrelation in the time-varying component of the 
error terms. This is tested by examining tests for serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, following Arellano and Bond (1991). When the model does not 
include an unobserved tax agency-specific effect, the model is estimated in levels, for 
both the regression equation and the set of instruments. This is called the GMM levels 
estimator. When the model includes an unobserved tax agency-specific effect 
(resulting from time invariant omitted factors such as symmetric measurement error), 
the model is estimated in both differences and levels, jointly in a system. This is called 
the GMM system estimator. The GMM system estimator was developed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) and it presents a significant improvement over the other panel 
estimation methods such as the first-difference GMM estimator. 
3.3. GMM Estimators 
The simplest model without strictly exogenous variables is an autoregressive 
specification of the form 
( ) ititiit vyy ++= − ηα 1   1<α       (2) 
Where ity is an observation on some series for individual i  in period t , ( )1−tiy  is 
the observation on the same series for the same individual in the previous period, iη  is 
an unobserved tax-agency specific time-invariant effect which allows for heterogeneity 
in the means of the ity  series across individuals, and itv  is a disturbance term. We 
assume that a random sample of N  individual time series ( )iTi yy K,1 is available. T  is 
small and N  is large. The individual effects ( )iη  are treated as being stochastic, which 
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implies they are necessarily correlated with the lagged dependent variable ( )1−tiy  
unless the distribution of the iη  is degenerate. The itv  are assumed to have finite 
moments and in particular ( ) ( ) 0== isitit vvEvE  for st ≠ . That is, we assume lack of 
serial correlation but not necessarily independence over time.  
Dynamic panel data models estimated using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) have become an important tool in the empirical analysis of 
microeconomic panels with a large number of individual units and relatively short time 
series.  
By Blundell and Bond (1998), the instruments used in the standard first-
difference GMM estimator, that is, estimators relying on lagged levels as instruments 
for current differences are likely to perform poorly when the series are close to a 
random walk, and when the variance of the tax-agency specific effect ( )iη  increases 
relative to the variance of the transitory shocks ( )itv . In this case the available 
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, and the GMM 
estimator is likely to suffer from serious finite sample bias, as well as imprecision. 
Instead they suggest the system generalized method of moment estimator, that is, the 
estimation of a simultaneous system of two equations. In this model, the instrumental 
variable is not only the lagged level of the explaining variables in the first difference 
equations, but also the lagged differences of the explaining variables in the level 
equations. One set of equations are the differenced equations: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,1,2,1,1, −−−−− −+−+−=− tiittiittititiit vvxxyyyy γβ                   (3) 
Since the differenced lagged dependent variable and differenced error term are 
correlated OLS estimator of (3) will not produce a consistent estimate of β , even if the 
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regressor, itx , is strictly exogenous, that is, ( ) 0=isitvxE  for all ts, . Thus, valid 
instruments have to be found for ( )2,1,1, −−− −=Δ tititi yyy . Assuming that the errors are 
independent across tax agency and serially uncorrelated - ( ) 0=isitvvE  for ts ≠  - and 
that the initial conditions satisfy ( ) 01 =iti vyE for 2≥t , then values of ity  lagged two 
periods or more are valid instruments in the first differenced growth equation, since 
2, −tiy  and earlier values are generally correlated with 1, −Δ tiy , but not with itvΔ .  
The other set of equations in the system are the levels equation  
itiittiit vxyy ++++= − ηγβα 1,       (4) 
Where the itx  regressor satisfies ( ) 0=Δ iitxE η  and the initial conditions satisfy the 
restriction ( ) 02 =Δ iiyE η . 
3.4. The Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions  
A fundamental assumption for the validity of GMM estimates is that the 
instruments are exogenous. The basic specification test for GMM estimators is the 
Sargan (1958)/Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan/Hansen 
test for joint validity of the instruments is standard after GMM estimation. 
The consistency of the parameters obtained by means of the GMM estimator 
depends on the validity of the instruments. The validity of the instruments is in each 
case tested based on two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995). The first test is the Sargan test of overidentification 
restrictions, which test the null hypothesis of overall validity of the instruments used. 
Failure to reject this null hypothesis provides support to the choice of the instruments. 
The test for serial correlation of the error is also reported, which tests the null 
hypothesis that the differenced error term is first and second order serial correlated. 
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Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation implies that 
the original error term is serially uncorrelated and the moment conditions are correctly 
specified.       
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is actually valid for any GMM 
regression on panel data, including OLS and 2SLS, as long as none of the regressors 
is “post-determined”, depending on future disturbances. A fixed effect or Within Groups 
regression can violate this assumption if T is small.  
Since the moment conditions used by the first-differenced GMM estimator are a 
strict subset of those used by the system GMM estimator, a Difference-Sargan test 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is based on difference between the two 
standard Sargan statistics and provides a more specific test of the additional moment 
conditions exploited by the system GMM estimator.  The Difference-Sargan test is a 
test of the additional moment conditions used in the system GMM estimators relative to 
the corresponding first-differenced GMM estimators. The difference-Sargan test is 
obtained by comparing the Sargan statistics of a restricted and an unrestricted model, 
the restricted model also including the additional instruments and moment conditions.   
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CHAPTER 4 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the regressions on performance to test the 
ratchet effect. The main econometric methodology is the GMM system estimator. For 
each regression, I test the specification of equation with the Sargan test of over 
identifying restrictions, and then with the Arellano-Bond test for the second order 
serial correlation. The test results demonstrate that all GMM system regressions 
satisfy the specification tests5, which indicates that our instruments are valid and 
there exists no evidence of second order serial correlation in our regressions.    
As a reference, I have estimated the OLS, Within Groups, 2SLS estimator for 
the equations in first differences, and the difference GMM estimators. One immediate 
problem in applying OLS to this model is that 1−tePerformanc  is endogenous to the 
fixed effects in the error term, which gives rise to dynamic panel bias. In particular, the 
OLS levels increase the coefficient estimate for lagged performance by attributing 
predictive power to it that actually belongs to the tax agency’s fixed effect. 
There are two ways to work around this endogeneity. One, the difference 
GMM, uses equation in first-differences to eliminate the tax agency-specific fixed 
effects. Endogenous variables in levels lagged two or more periods will be valid 
instruments, provided there is no autocorrelation in the time-varying component of 
the error terms6. The other, GMM system, the differenced equations –using level 
instruments– are combined with equations in level - using differences as instruments.  
The regression estimated for the period August 1989 to April 1993 reported the 
following results: 
                                            
5 In the context of GMM system estimator the residual of the regression is the original error 
term in differences and thus is expected to exhibit first-order but not second-order serial 
correlation.  
6 This is tested by examining tests for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
following Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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Table 4: Regression results: Ratchet effect  


















































































( )1AR  -4.23  -5.32 -5.17 -5.66 -5.93 -5.84 















Notes: Quarters dummies variables are included as instruments in GMM specifications. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation, 
asymptotically N (0, 1). These test the levels residuals for OLS levels, and the first-differenced residuals 
in all columns. GMM results are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
test statistics. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM, asymptotically χ2. P-value is 
reported. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Estimations performed using GMM-system 
procedure combining transformed and level instruments. Variables instrumented: Performance, Energy 
and GDP.  
 
The first three columns in table 4 present the OLS estimates of the Ratchet effect 
in levels, the within groups and 2SLS estimator for the equations in first differences. The 
within groups and 2SLS estimator for the equations in first differences estimators are 
added here for comparison. The within groups estimates for the Ratchet effect are quite 
similar to the OLS results. For the lagged dependent variable the estimate is reduced to 
0.58, suggesting less persistence in the performance7. The serial correlation tests AR (1) 
and AR (2) reported for OLS levels do not reject the null hypothesis of no first order serial 
correlation, but reject the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation. This need 
                                            
7 As expected in the presence of tax agency-specific effects, OLS levels appears to give an 
upwards-biased estimate of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, while the within-




not indicate that the AR(1) model is misspecified, since the estimates of these residuals 
are likely to be biased (see Bond 2002). The OLS and within groups results do not control 
for the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Moreover, an 
estimating model by OLS usually presumed that factors, such as a manager’s capability 
within tax agencies, skill of the tax agents, types of taxpayers residing in the region, affects 
the performance. For example, the tax agency has good resources, such as manager’s 
capability and the skill of the tax agent etc. that cannot be observed, that it can accomplish 
more performance.   
Columns (4) and (5) present the two-step first-differenced GMM estimators. For 
the GMM estimators, the reported test statistics consider serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, but the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation is 
rejected. The validity of the lagged levels dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments in the first-
differenced equations is clearly rejected by the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions8. The Sargan test confirms a misspecification problem. In other words, the 
chosen instrumental variables are correlated with the disturbance. This is consistent with 
the presence of measurement errors. The parameters may not be identified using first-
differenced GMM estimators when the series are random walks, and more generally 
identification may be weak when the series are near unit root processes (Bond 2002)9.  
The results in the fifth and sixth columns are obtained using GMM system 
estimators. The results for GMM system estimator are supported by the specification 
test.  The system GMM parameter estimates appear to be reasonable, because it has 
much smaller finite sample bias and much greater precision when estimating 
autoregressive parameters using persistent series. There is an increase in the power 
of the Sargan test to reject the instruments used in the first differenced equations. 
                                            
8 P-value reported. 
9 AR (1) models, including quarter dummies, are estimated to examine the rate of persistence 
in data. See tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. 
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However, I find that the AFTN variable that was insignificant in column (6) becomes 
statistically significant in column (7).  
I have implemented the full two-step GMM system estimator, using the finite-
sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix proposed by Windmeijer (2000)10. 
With regard to the GMM system specification adopted the regression in columns (6) 
and (7) are supported by the Sargan test, thus confirms that the instruments used are 
valid (i.e. the instruments used are not correlated with the errors). As expected there is 
evidence for first-order serial correlation, while there is no evidence of second-order 
serial correlation.   
The significance of the lagged value of performance in all the estimated models 
indicate that the dynamic specification used is appropriate and the estimated 
coefficient confirms the existence of a ratchet effect in the bonus program between 
August 1989 and April 1993. The coefficient of Performance is positive and statistically 
significant in all specification. Thus, the better performance in reach the target today by 
the agents, the larger the increase of the target in the following period.  
The coefficients of the Labour productivity variables – TTN and AFTN – have 
negative signs, as expected. This was to be expected under the hypothesis that the 
bonus program would exert more pressure on the most inefficient tax agencies. The 
result is significantly different from zero for administrative bureaucrats (TTNs) and for 
High-level supervisors assigned (AFTNs). The variable (TTNs) is a proxy for size of the 
tax agency, an increase in the size of the agency would be associated with a reduction 
in the performance.  
Fines collected appear to be significantly and positively correlated with 
performance, although its effect on performance is small in magnitude. This result 
                                            
10 The two-step procedure was used to obtain efficient and consistent estimates, which 
explores residuals from the first step to construct the consistent estimate of variance-
covariance matrix.  
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suggests that the information about the real fines collected is used in the Brazilian tax 
authority’s incentive program as a reference to set the targets. The signs for AFTN did 
not coincide in all the regressions.    
 
Table 5: Alternative Regression results: Ratchet effect  






































































( )1AR  -2.70  -4.82 -5.35 -4.59 -5.09 















Notes: Monthly dummies variables are included (but not reported) in all specifications. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation, asymptotically N 
(0, 1). These test the levels residuals for OLS levels, and the first-differenced residuals in all columns. GMM 
results are two-step estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics. Sargan is a 
test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM, asymptotically χ2. P-value is reported. This test uses the 
minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Estimations performed using GMM-system procedure combining transformed and 
level instruments. Variables instrumented: Performance, Energy and GDP.  
 
The results in table 5 show alternative results of the regressions on performance 
to test the ratchet effect including monthly time dummies as independent variables to 
capture time varying effects and correct for seasonality in collecting fines. The system 
GMM parameter estimators for fines collected and high-level supervisors assigned 
(AFTN) in column (5) become statistically insignificant when time dummies are included 




I have analyzed the ratchet effect in the context of the performance scheme 
implemented by Brazilian tax collection to reward tax officials for their efforts in 
collecting taxes and uncovering tax violations, using an unbalanced panel data for 110 
tax agencies from August 1989 to April 1993 and employing the GMM-system 
estimator. 
The empirical evidence and econometrics results show that the main negative 
aspect of The Brazilian tax authority’s incentive program is its credibility as an 
incentive scheme; in that bonus for individual performance were poorly managed, with 
nearly all staff members receiving the maximum score. Instead, the presence of 
ratchet effect was verified and the program had been incorporated a ratchet effect, i.e., 
the better the accomplishment, the larger the target in the subsequent period.  
This paper is one of the first papers which try to model the complex phenomena 
of ratcheting in Public Sector. The main finding of this research is that the bonus 
program is sensitive to a tax agency past economic performance. In addition, the 
Labour productivity variables – TTN and AFTN – used in this research are important 
components to determine the tax agency’s performance. It is also a proxy for the tax 
agency characteristics, such as the size of the tax agency, as larger the tax agency 
worse is its performance.   
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APPENDIX A – AR(1) SPECIFICATION FOR THE SERIES 
Table A.1: Alternative Estimates of the AR (1) Specification 













































Notes: Quarters dummies included in all models (but not reported) Quarters dummies variables are also 
included as instruments in GMM-diff. specifications. Standard errors reported in parentheses. AR (1) and 
AR (2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation, asymptotically N (0, 1). These test the 
levels residuals for OLS levels, and the first-differenced residuals in all columns. GMM results are two-
step estimates. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM, asymptotically χ2. P-value 
is reported. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. ***, ** and 
* indicate coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Notes: Quarters dummies included in all models (but not reported) Quarters dummies variables are also 
included as instruments in GMM-diff. specifications. Standard errors reported in parentheses. AR (1) and 
AR (2) are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation, asymptotically N (0, 1). These test the 
levels residuals for OLS levels, and the first-differenced residuals in all columns. GMM results are two-
step estimates. Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM, asymptotically χ2. P-value 
is reported. This test uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators. ***, ** and 
* indicate coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
Table A.2 reports simple AR (1) for the four series, Fines, TTN, AFTN and 
Ranking. All four series are found to be highly persistent, with OLS level estimates 
near an exact unit root. For TTN and AFTN series, system GMM estimators 
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